The present study explored psychological predictors of response to a series of three 25 second inhalations of 20% carbon dioxide-enriched air in 60 nonclinical participants. Multiple regression analyses indicated that only anxiety sensitivity physical concerns predicted self-reported fear, whereas both physical anxiety sensitivity concerns and behavioural inhibition sensitivity independently predicted affective ratings of emotional arousal. In contrast, the psychological concerns anxiety sensitivity dimension predicted ratings of emotional displeasure (valence), and both psychological anxiety sensitivity concerns and behavioural inhibition sensitivity independently predicted (...) emotional dyscontrol. No variables significantly predicted heart rate. These data are in accord with current models of emotional reactivity that highlight the role of cognitive variables in the production of anxious and fearful responding to somatic perturbation, and help further clarify the particular predictors of anxiety-related responding to biological challenge. (shrink)

That robots might become persons is increasingly explored in popular fiction and films and is receiving growing academic analysis. Here, I ask what would be necessary for robots not to become persons at some point. After examining the meanings of “robots” and “persons,” I discuss whether robots might not become persons from a range of perspectives: evolution (which has led over time from species that do not exhibit personhood to species that do), development (personhood is something into which each of (...) us grows), chemistry (must persons be carbon‐based and must robots be non–carbon‐based?), history (we now consider more entities to be persons than was once the case), and theology (are humans privileged over the rest of creation, and how relevant is panpsychism?). I end by considering some of the implications if/once robots do become persons. (shrink)

The Earth agglomerates and heats. Convection cells within the planetary interior expedite the cooling process. Volcanoes evolve steam, carbon dioxide, sulfur dioxide and pyrophosphate. An acidulous Hadean ocean condenses from the carbon dioxide atmosphere. Dusts and stratospheric sulfurous smogs absorb a proportion of the Sun’s rays. The cooled ocean leaks into the stressed crust and also convects. High temperature acid springs, coupled to magmatic plumes and spreading centers, emit iron, manganese, zinc, cobalt and nickel ions to the ocean. Away from (...) the spreading centers cooler alkaline spring waters emanate from the ocean floor. These bear hydrogen, formate, ammonia, hydrosulfide and minor methane thiol. The thermal potential begins to be dissipated but the chemical potential is dammed. The exhaling alkaline solutions are frustrated in their further attempt to mix thoroughly with their oceanic source by the spontaneous precipitation of biomorphic barriers of colloidal iron compounds and other minerals. It is here we surmise that organic molecules are synthesized, filtered, concentrated and adsorbed, while acetate and methane—separate products of the precursor to the reductive acetyl-coenzyme-A pathway—are exhaled as waste. Reactions in mineral compartments produce acetate, amino acids, and the components of nucleosides. Short peptides, condensed from the simple amino acids, sequester ‘ready-made’ iron sulfide clusters to form protoferredoxins, and also bind phosphates. Nucleotides are assembled from amino acids, simple phosphates carbon dioxide and ribose phosphate upon nanocrystalline mineral surfaces. The side chains of particular amino acids register to fitting nucleotide triplet clefts. Keyed in, the amino acids are polymerized, through acid–base catalysis, to alpha chains. Peptides, the tenuous outer-most filaments of the nanocrysts, continually peel away from bound RNA. The polymers are concentrated at cooler regions of the mineral compartments through thermophoresis. RNA is reproduced through a convective polymerase chain reaction operating between 40 and 100°C. The coded peptides produce true ferredoxins, the ubiquitous proteins with the longest evolutionary pedigree. They take over the role of catalyst and electron transfer agent from the iron sulfides. Other iron–nickel sulfide clusters, sequestered now by cysteine residues as CO-dehydrogenase and acetyl-coenzyme-A synthase, promote further chemosynthesis and support the hatchery—the electrochemical reactor—from which they sprang. Reactions and interactions fall into step as further pathways are negotiated. This hydrothermal circuitry offers a continuous supply of material and chemical energy, as well as electricity and proticity at a potential appropriate for the onset of life in the dark, a rapidly emerging kinetic structure born to persist, evolve and generate entropy while the sun shines. (shrink)

The coevolution of humans with their intestinal microflora has resulted in cooperative relationships that have shaped the biology and the genomes of these symbiotic partners. Bacteroides thetaiotaomicron is one such bacterial symbiont that is a dominant member of the intestinal microbiota of humans and other mammals. The recent report of the genome sequence of B. thetaiotaomicron1 is the first reported for an abundant Gram‐negative organism of the human colonic microbiota and, as such, provides the first glimpse on a genomic scale (...) of the genetic arsenal used by a Gram‐negative symbiont to dominate in this ecosystem. The genome has revealed large expansions of many paralogous groups of genes that encode products essential to the organism's ability to successfully compete in this environment. Most noteable is the organism's abundant machinery for utilizing a large variety of complex polysaccharides as a source of carbon and energy. The proteome also reveals the organism's extensive ability to adapt and regulate expression of its genes in response to the changing ecosystem. These factors, as well as others highlighted below, suggest an incredibly flexible and adaptable organism that is exquisitely equipped to dominate in its challenging and competitive niche. BioEssays 25:926–929, 2003. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

Empirical evidence advancing the theory of anthropogenic climate change and resultant policy action has been framed through the perspectives of scientists, economists and politicians; the ultimate objective being to minimise the risk of dangerous climate change through the reduction of GHG emissions. However, policies designed to reduce carbon pollution have utilised cost benefit analysis , largely ignoring ethical implications of such actions. This has resulted in a climate debate that sidelines the moral and social considerations of the suggested actions designed (...) to reduce the impact of dangerous climate change. Special interest groups have focussed on subjective interpretations of objective statistics, resulting in an extreme polarisation of viewpoints, pitting climate change deniers against politico-economic rationalists, with climate scientists largely sitting on the sidelines. There has, however, been a recent shift in the science of climate change acknowledging that, “many profound ethical questions are hidden in scientific and economic arguments about various climate change policy proposals” ‘White Paper on the Ethical Dimensions of Climate Change’, Rock Ethics Institute, Penn State University). We wish to promote an inter-disciplinary approach to the ethical considerations of climate change and situate the debate within a ‘real world’ context to enable people to link evidence and resultant policy to their own moral responsibility as ‘global citizens’. By placing reliable scientific information within a holistic framework, scientific outcomes with a high level of certainty may be conveyed within a wider perspective that includes ethical and social considerations, resulting in a stronger claim for practical outcomes with respect to climate change solutions. This can be used to support policies that are practical as well as moral. (shrink)

The prenylated proteins represent a newly discovered class of post‐translationally modified proteins. The known prenylated proteins include the oncogene product p21ras and other low molecular weight GTP‐binding proteins, the nuclear lamins, and the γ subunit of the heterotrimeric G proteins. The modification involves the covalent attachment of a 15‐carbon (farnesyl) or 20‐carbon (geranylgeranyl) isoprenoid moiety in a thioether linkage to a carboxyl terminal cysteine. The nature of the attached substituent is dependent on specific sequence information in the carboxyl terminus of (...) the protein. In addition, prenylation entrains other post‐translational modifications forming a reaction pathway. In this article, we review our current understanding of the biochemical reactions involved in prenylation and discuss the possible role of this modification in the control of cellular functions such as protein maturation and cell growth. (shrink)

The healthcare industry generates significant waste and carbon emissions that negatively impact the environment. Intensive care units are a major contributor to the production of waste, due t...

Every choice we make is set against a background of massive ignorance about our past, our future, our circumstances, and ourselves. Philosophers are divided on the moral significance of such ignorance. Some say that it has a direct impact on how we ought to behave - the question of what our moral obligations are; others deny this, claiming that it only affects how we ought to be judged in light of the behaviour in which we choose to engage - the (...) question of what responsibility we bear for our choices. Michael Zimmerman claims that our ignorance has an important bearing on both questions, and offers an account of moral obligation and moral responsibility that is sharply at odds with the prevailing wisdom. His book will be of interest to a wide range of readers in ethics. (shrink)

Sceptical theists--e.g., William Alston and Michael Bergmann--have claimed that considerations concerning human cognitive limitations are alone sufficient to undermine evidential arguments from evil. We argue that, if the considerations deployed by sceptical theists are sufficient to undermine evidential arguments from evil, then those considerations are also sufficient to undermine inferences that play a crucial role in ordinary moral reasoning. If cogent, our argument suffices to discredit sceptical theist responses to evidential arguments from evil.

The principal aim of this book is to develop and defend an analysis of the concept of moral obligation. The analysis is neutral regarding competing substantive theories of obligation, whether consequentialist or deontological in character. What it seeks to do is generate solutions to a range of philosophical problems concerning obligation and its application. Amongst these problems are deontic paradoxes, the supersession of obligation, conditional obligation, prima facie obligation, actualism and possibilism, dilemmas, supererogation, and cooperation. By virtue of its normative (...) neutrality, the analysis provides a theoretical framework within which competing theories of obligation can be developed and assessed. This study is a major contribution to metaethics that will be of particular interest to all philosophers concerned with normative ethical theory. (shrink)

This superbly crafted account of the notion of moral responsibility and of its relations to freedom, control, ignorance, negligence, attempts, omissions, compulsion, mental disorders, virtues and vices, desert, and punishment fills that gap. The treatment of character and luck is particularly sophisticated and well-argued.

At the heart of ethics reside the concepts of good and bad; they are at work when we assess whether a person is virtuous or vicious, an act right or wrong, a decision defensible or indefensible, a goal desirable or undesirable. But there are many varieties of goodness and badness. At their core lie intrinsic goodness and badness, the sort of value that something has for its own sake. It is in virtue of intrinsic value that other types of value (...) may be understood, and hence that we can begin to come to terms with questions of virtue and vice, right and wrong, and so on. This book investigates the nature of intrinsic value: just what it is for something to be valuable for its own sake, just what sort of thing can have such value, just how such a value is to be computed. In the final chapter, the fruits of this investigation are applied to a discussion of pleasure, pain, and displeasure and also of moral virtue and vice, in order to determine just what value lies within these phenomena. (shrink)

This essay focuses on a recently prominent notion of ground which is distinctive for how it links metaphysics to explanation. Ground is supposed to serve both as the common factor in diverse in virtue of questions as well as the structuring relation in the project of explaining how some phenomena are “built” from more fundamental phenomena. My aim is to provide an opinionated synopsis of this notion of ground without engaging with others. Ground, so understood, generally resists illumination by appeal (...) to more familiar models of explanation. Nevertheless, its distinctive explanatory and metaphysical aspects guide us on characterizing its explanatory logic and its metaphysical features. Some issues concerning the meta-question of what grounds ground are explored, as well as some recent skeptical challenges to ground. (shrink)

There is currently an explosion of interest in grounding. In this article we provide an overview of the debate so far. We begin by introducing the concept of grounding, before discussing several kinds of scepticism about the topic. We then identify a range of central questions in the theory of grounding and discuss competing answers to them that have emerged in the debate. We close by raising some questions that have been relatively neglected but which warrant further attention.

Michael J. Zimmerman explores whether and how our ignorance about ourselves and our circumstances affects what our moral obligations and moral rights are. He rejects objective and subjective views of the nature of moral obligation, and presents a new case for a 'prospective' view.

Intrinsic value has traditionally been thought to lie at the heart of ethics. Philosophers use a number of terms to refer to such value. The intrinsic value of something is said to be the value that that thing has “in itself,” or “for its own sake,” or “as such,” or “in its own right.” Extrinsic value is value that is not intrinsic.

I defend (metaphysical) ground against recent, unanswered objections aiming to dismiss it from serious philosophical inquiry. Interest in ground stems from its role in the venerable metaphysical project of identifying which facts hold in virtue of others. Recent work on ground focuses on regimenting it. But many reject ground itself, seeing regimentation as yet another misguided attempt to regiment a bad idea (like phlogiston or astrology). I defend ground directly against objections that it is confused, incoherent, or fruitless. This vindicates (...) the very attempt to regiment ground. It also refocuses our attention on the genuine open questions about ground and away from the distracting, unpersuasive reasons for dismissing them. (shrink)

Bringing together researchers from across the cognitive sciences, the book is valuable for philosophers of mind, developmental and comparative psychologists, and neuroscientists.

A commonly held view is that a central aim of metaphysics is to give a fundamental account of reality which refers only to the fundamental entities. But a puzzle arises. It is at least a working hypothesis for those pursuing the aim that, first, there must be fundamental entities. But, second, it also seems possible that the world has no foundation, with each entity depending on others. These two claims are inconsistent with the widely held third claim that the fundamental (...) just is the foundational. It is tempting to resolve the puzzle by rejecting the first or second claim, perhaps because it is obscure how the third claim might plausibly be challenged. But I develop a new analysis of fundamentality which challenges the third claim by allowing for an entity to be fundamental without being foundational. The analysis, roughly, is that an entity is fundamental just in case not all facts about it are grounded in facts about other entities. The possibility of fundamentality without foundations not only provides for a novel resolution to the puzzle, but has applications to some live debates: for example, it undermines Jonathan Schaffer's modal argument for priority monism. (shrink)

_The Metaphysics of Perfect Beings_ addresses the problems an Anselmian perfect being faces in contexts involving unlimited options. Recent advances in the theory of vagueness, the metaphysics of multiverses and hyperspace, the theory of dynamic or sequential choice, the logic of moral and rational dilemmas, and metaethical theory provide the resources to formulate the new challenges and the Anselmian responses with an unusual degree of precision. Almeida shows that the challenges arising in the unusual contexts involving unlimited options sometimes produce (...) metaphysical surprise. (shrink)

The following argument is addressed: (1) a person is morally responsible for an event's occurring only if that event's occurring was not a matter of luck; (2) no event is such that its occurring is not a matter of luck; therefore, (3) no event is such that someone is morally responsible for its occurring. Two notions of control are distinguished: restricted and complete. (2) is shown false on the first interpretation, (1) on the second. The discussion involves a distinction between (...) resultant and situational luck, And it is argued that, Even when luck's role in life, And the unfairness that stems from it, Is acknowledged, Moral responsibility remains possible. (shrink)

In _The Immorality of Punishment_ Michael Zimmerman argues forcefully that not only our current practice but indeed any practice of legal punishment is deeply morally repugnant, no matter how vile the behaviour that is its target. Despite the fact that it may be difficult to imagine a state functioning at all, let alone well, without having recourse to punishing those who break its laws, Zimmerman makes a timely and compelling case for the view that we must seek and put (...) into practice alternative means of preventing crime and promoting social stability. (shrink)

A liberal society seeks not to impose a single way of life, but to leave its citizens as free as possible to choose their own values and ends. It therefore must govern by principles of justice that do not presuppose any particular vision of the good life. But can any such principles be found? And if not, what are the consequences for justice as a moral and political ideal? These are the questions Michael Sandel takes up in this penetrating (...) critique of contemporary liberalism. Sandel locates modern liberalism in the tradition of Kant, and focuses on its most influential recent expression in the work of John Rawls. In the most important challenge yet to Rawls' theory of justice, Sandel traces the limits of liberalism to the conception of the person that underlies it, and argues for a deeper understanding of community than liberalism allows. (shrink)

Much of the science and religion debate has focussed on statistics. The chapters in this section go beyond bare statistics by examining more nuanced studies of science, religion and education with the aim of developing a deeper understanding of the issues at play when attempting to deal with the issues of science and religion in the classroom.

Many philosophers hold that whether an act is overall morally obligatory is an ‘objective’ matter, many that it is a ‘subjective’ matter, and some that it is both. The idea that it is or can be both may seem to promise a helpful answer to the question ‘What ought I to do when I do not know what I ought to do?’ In this article, three broad views are distinguished regarding what it is that obligation essentially concerns: the maximization of (...) actual value, the maximization of expected value, and the perceived maximization of actual value. The first and third views are rejected; the second view is then refined and defended. The unfortunate upshot is that there may be no very helpful answer to the question just mentioned. As to the question posed in the title of the article, the answer unsurprisingly depends on what ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ are taken to mean. (Published Online November 24 2006). (shrink)

There has been much recent interest in a distinctively metaphysical kind of determinative explanation: ground. This paper concerns various skeptical challenges to ground’s relevance to metaphysics, such as that it is an empty posit, that the work it is supposed to do is appropriated by other notions, and that it is inapt for specific issues it should serve. I argue against these challenges. My strategy is both critical and constructive. Critical because I argue that versions of these challenges raised by (...) Elizabeth Barnes, Kathrin Koslicki, Mari Mikkola, and Jessica Wilson are not persuasive. Constructive because we may nevertheless learn from them new work for ground. (shrink)

_Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction_ is for students who have already completed an introductory philosophy course and need a fresh look at the central topics in the core subject of metaphysics. It is essential reading for any student of the subject. This Fourth Edition is revised and updated and includes two new chapters on Parts and Wholes, and Metaphysical Indeterminacy or vagueness. This new edition also keeps the user-friendly format, the chapter overviews summarizing the main topics, concrete examples to clarify difficult (...) concepts, annotated further reading at the end of each chapter, endnotes, and a full bibliography. Topics addressed include: the problem of universals the nature of abstract entities the problem of individuation the nature of modality identity through time the nature of time the nature of parts and wholes the problem of metaphysical indeterminacy the Realism/anti-Realism debate. Wherever possible, Michael J. Loux and Thomas M. Crisp relate contemporary views to their classical sources in the history of philosophy. As experienced teachers of philosophy and important contributors to recent debates, Loux and Crisp are uniquely qualified to write this book. (shrink)

A collection of 37 essays surveying the state of the art on metaphysical ground. -/- Essay authors are: Fatema Amijee, Ricki Bliss, Amanda Bryant, Margaret Cameron, Phil Corkum, Fabrice Correia, Louis deRosset, Scott Dixon, Tom Donaldson, Nina Emery, Kit Fine, Martin Glazier, Kathrin Koslicki, David Mark Kovacs, Stephan Krämer, Stephanie Leary, Stephan Leuenberger, Jon Litland, Marko Malink, Michaela McSweeney, Kevin Mulligan, Alyssa Ney, Asya Passinsky, Francesca Poggiolesi, Kevin Richardson, Stefan Roski, Noel Saenz, Benjamin Schnieder, Erica Shumener, Alexander Skiles, Olla Solomyak, (...) Tuomas Tahko, Naomi Thompson, Kelly Trogdon, Jennifer Wang, Tobias Wilsch, and Justin Zylstra. (shrink)

Some carnivores defend the position that the opportunistic consumption of meat is morally permissible even under the assumption that it is morally wrong to act in ways that ause unnecessary suffering to sentient beings. Ordering and consuming chicken once a week, they argue, will not increase the numbers of chickens suffering or slaughtered, since the system of purchasing and farming chickens is not sufficiently fine‐tuned to register differences at margin. We argue that, insensitivity of the market notwithstanding, consistent consequentialists are (...) morally prohibited from each additional purchase and consumption of meat. (shrink)

Many philosophers endorse the idea that there can be no moral responsibility without a moral community and thus hold that such responsibility is essentially interpersonal. In this paper, various interpretations of this idea are distinguished, and it is argued that no interpretation of it captures a significant truth. The popular view that moral responsibility consists in answerability is discussed and dismissed. The even more popular view that such responsibility consists in susceptibility to the reactive attitudes is also discussed, and it (...) is argued that this view at best supports only an etiolated interpretation of the idea that moral responsibility is essentially interpersonal. (shrink)

This paper explores the prospects of combining two views. The first view is metaphysical rationalism : all things have an explanation. The second view is metaphysical essentialism: there are real essences. The exploration is motivated by a conflict between the views. Metaphysical essentialism posits facts about essences. Metaphysical rationalism demands explanations for all facts. But facts about essences appear to resist explanation. I consider two solutions to the conflict. Exemption solutions attempt to exempt facts about essences from the demand for (...) explanation. Explanation solutions attempt to explain facts about essences. I argue that exemption solutions are less promising than explanation solutions. I then consider how explanation solutions might be developed. I suggest that a “generative” approach is most promising. I tentatively conclude that the prospects for combining metaphysical rationalism and metaphysical essentialism turn on the viability of a generative approach. This sets the agenda for defending the combination as well as the more general project of explaining essences. (shrink)

Introduction: Doing the right thing -- Utilitarianism : Bentham and J.S. Mill -- Libertarianism -- John Locke -- Markets and morals -- Immanuel Kant -- John Rawls -- Affirmative action -- Aristotle -- Liberals and communitarians -- Conclusion: Reconnecting politics and morals.

What's wrong with designer children, bionic athletes, and genetic engineering.

University of North Carolina at Greensboro Greensboro, NC 27402-6170, USA.